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Greenfield Pioneers in theAmerican Southeast:
Empirical and Game-theoretic Perspectives
for Planning
Initial core "pioneers" in greenfield industrial districts tend to develop crucial supplier
networks around them, leading an unusual set of private and public incentives. Highlighting
findings from previous research, empirical evidence from the Kentucky Toyota plant suggests
that a core plant will spark the formation of a sharable supply network, differentiated by
criticalness of parts, distance from plant, and timing of establishment. However, these links
may result in skewed private and public incentives, which are modeled in a game-theoretic
framework. If left to market solutions, potentially significant intra- and inter-regional market
failures may emerge, leading to potential justification for planning intervention.
Eric Thompson, Stephan Weiler and
Terutomo Ozawa
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is a condensed version of
research recently published in the journal
Planning and Markets (Weiler, Thompson,
and Ozawa, 2001 ), which explores the motiva-
tion, context, and incentives inherent in
greenfield industrial site development. This
shorter paper highlights the research's principal
findings, with particular emphasis on the empiri-
cal and game-theoretic perspectives. The
combination ofempirical findings, which
assesses the clustering process around the
Georgetown, Kentucky Toyota plant, with
game-theoretic analyses, highlighting the private
firm and public agent decision dynamics,
provides unique insights into the opportunities
and challenges ofevolving industrial districts.
Empirical evidence shows the clear
formation of a sharable supplier network
around Toyota in Kentucky. The establishment
of a core plant sparked a network of dozens of
suppliers, with potential positive spillovers to
following carmakers. In addition, such cluster-
ing may lead to substantial benefits for the focal
local economies (Fujita & Hill, 1995). Given
this unusual situation, the paper then considers
the pitfalls of private and public incentives in the
context of the resultant inter-and intra-regional
through market outcomes. Associated market
failures could createjustifications for planning.
H. THE CASE OFTHE KENTUCKY
TOYOTAPLANT CLUSTER
In their study ofJapanese-affiliated auto-
motive manufacturing plants across the United
States, Smith & Florida ( 1 994) found that new
firms in particular preferred locations near
established Japanese automotive assemblers.
Given these broad results, the recent growth of
international automobile manufacturing in the
southeast provides a useful case study setting in
which to assess the evolution of a new industrial
district. We use the case of the Toyota plant in
Kentucky to understand both the specific and
more general implications ofsuch greenfield site
development.
The primary hypothesis of the core plant
perspective is that a core assembler should
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either bring or attract a network of suppliers
around the assembly plant. Furthermore, given
the necessity ofjust-in-time (JYT) practices to
modern competitiveness, clustering of the most
critical part suppliers should occur most quickly
and most closely around this core plant as well.
The supplier network of the Toyota Motor
Corporation assembly factory in Georgetown,
Kentucky provides a useful example of this
phenomenon. The assembly plant has attracted
a significant number ofnew suppliers to the
area, particularly from Japan, thereby contribut-
ing to the base of regional suppliers. The
assembly plant also has utilized a number of
existing suppliers, partly present in the region, to
supply previously established regional assembly
plants. These assembly plants include the Ford
Motors facility in Louisville, Kentucky; the
General Motors Corvette facility in Bowling
Green, Kentucky, and the Nissan Motors
facility in Smyrna, Tennessee.
a) Analytical Framework
The empirical analysis will examine the
development of the supplier network for this
Toyota plant both geographically and over time.
In particular, the analysis will assess whether
critical suppliers for Toyota: 1) tend to be
located closer to the assembly plant; and 2) be
more likely to be new investments. The hy-
pothesized proximity of the suppliers and their
more recent establishment are driven by the
critical just-in-time inventory and delivery needs
required by the core plant. This projected
relationship is schematically illustrated in Figure
1 . Criticalness, which represents the asset-
specificity ofCPA for Toyota, is measured on
the vertical access, and distance of suppliers
from the core plant is measured on the horizon-
tal access. A negative relationship between
criticalness and distance is hypothesized; more
critical and asset-specific part suppliers are
expected to be located closer to the Toyota
assembly plant. In addition, those critical
suppliers locating near the core plant are likely
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Figure 1: Criticalness ofCPAs as a locational
determinant of suppliers.
to be more recendy established to satisfy JIT
delivery needs.
b) Data and Methodology
A measure of "criticalness" will be devel-
oped for the parts produced at each Toyota
supplier plant. Distance from the plant in miles
will then be measured, as will the age of the
plant in order to determine whether the plant
was opened before the Toyota assembly plant,
or afterwards.
A data set was assembled of regional
parts suppliers for the Toyota sedan assembly
plant in Georgetown, Kentucky. The region was
composed of the states adjacent to Kentucky:
Illinois, Indiana. Missouri. Ohio. Tennessee,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Data was gathered
on the location, age. and type of car part
produced for each of 1 1 8 parts suppliers
located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
adjacent states. 1 Of the 1 18 regional suppliers.
38 were located in Kentucky, 26 were located
in Ohio, 17 in Indiana, 15 in Illinois, and 12 in
Tennessee.
The supplier list was for production in
1 992. Thus, the supplier list developed reflects
what existed in Kentucky and adjacent states
five years after assembly began at the Toyota
facility in 1987, and seven years after the site
was chosen in 1985. The list of suppliers was
not acquired directly from Toyota, which
naturally limits its release of information about
its suppliers. The list was based on the report
The Economic Significance of Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., in Kentucky
(Haywood, 1992). The report published
information about the city of location and type
of part supplied by each supplier. Further study
was used to identify the beginning year of
operation, and where possible, more specific
information about the type of part produced.
One advantage of this list from 1992
relative to a current list is that the 1 992 list only
represents suppliers to production at the
Georgetown assembly plant. A more current list
could include suppliers to plants in either
Georgetown, KY or Buffalo, WV, where
engines are now built. Further, the list from
1 992 reflects substantial development in
Toyota's supplier network. It is worth noting
that, as of 1 998, the number of Kentucky
suppliers had only risen from 38 (in 1 992) to
56, indicating that, at least for the Kentucky
supplier network, the network was already well
developed by 1992 (Haywood, 1998).
Each regional Toyota parts supplier also
was assigned a rank for "criticalness." This term
reflects the extent to which the part supplied is
custom designed for Toyota sedans assembled
at Georgetown. Criticalness was ranked at a
value of through 2. A value of was assigned
to purchases of basic products, which are
products ofuse in a number of industries
besides auto assembly such as raw steel, solder,
chemical coatings, and paints. Purchases that
are specifically auto parts but tend to be
standard across many makes and models such
as tires, wheels, window glass, and engine belts
were assigned a ranking of 1 . Auto parts likely
to be specialized for a particular make and
model such as stampings, trim, seat assemblies,
engine tubing, throttles, and break and suspen-
sion components received a ranking of 2. The
average value for criticalness among all 1 1
8
regional parts suppliers was 1 . 1 . A higher
ranking indicates that the supplier is more
critical/specific to the plant.
c) Results
The network of regional parts suppliers to
the Toyota Motor Corporation's Georgetown
plant follows the expected geographic and
temporal pattern. Plants producing parts more
regional suppliers that are new facilities built
during or after 1987, both by overall and
Number of Suppliers
Share of Suppliers that Began
Operations During or After 1987
Average Distance of Suppliers
From the Georgetown. KY
Assembly Plants (in miles)
"Criticalness" Ranking
1 2 Overall
37 34 47 118
.4% 14.7% 40.0% 1 21.2%
224 245 157
' Statistically differentfrom ranks and I at the 5% significance level.
204
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Location and Age of Regional Parts Suppliers to Toyota Motor
Corporation by "Criticalness" Ranking
criticalness rank. Suppliers with a high critical-
ness rank are much more likely to have been
built after 1987. Of suppliers with the highest
"criticalness" rank (2), 40 percent were built
during or after 1987, compared to just 15
percent for Toyota suppliers with a rank of 1
,
and 5 percent for suppliers with a rank of 0.
Plants that began operation in 1987 or later
were much more likely to be among the list of
most critical Toyota suppliers.
Table 2 also shows the average distance
of regional suppliers from the Toyota
Georgetown assembly facility. The distance is
illustrated for regional suppliers overall and for
the three different criticalness ranks. The
regional suppliers that are ranked most critical
are located nearer to Georgetown, Kentucky.
In particular, parts suppliers producing the most
critical ranked parts were on average located
from 70 to 90 miles closer to the Georgetown
plant than parts suppliers producing less critical
parts. Looked at another way, supplier plants
located closer to an assembly plant are much
more likely to be suppliers of critical parts.
To test this proposition, an ordered logit
regression was run relating "criticalness" rank
with distance from the Georgetown assembly
plant. Results of this regression are illustrated in
Table 3. Regression results indicate that the
likelihood of a supplier producing the most
"critical" parts (rank of 2) falls with distance.
The negative and statistically significant coeffi-
cient indicates that as suppliers move further
from an assembly plant the suppliers are less
likely to supply the plant with the most "critical"
types ofparts. Figure 2 illustrates the likelihood
that a supplier making a most "critical" part falls
from 55 percent for a supplier plant located
within one mile ofan assembly plant to a
probability of 32 percent for a supplier plant
located 300 miles from an assembly plant
In sum, the results discussed above
indicate that Toyota tended to procure more
critical parts from plants that are located closer
to the Georgetown assembly plant, and from
newer parts suppliers opened concurrently with
or after the Toyota assembly plant began
operations. Toyota has organized a supplier
network where the most critical parts are made
nearby, and by new suppliers attracted to the
region. Toyota brought critical suppliers to
Kentucky and adjacent states to build its
supplier network, but also utilized the existing
network of regional suppliers. This behavior is
consistent withjust-in-time manufacturing and
co-design between supplier and assembler for
customized parts.
HI. TWIN MARKET FAILURES?
Once established, such an assembler-
supplier network should provide both cost-
efficiency and near-customer-specific market
niches for participating car companies, as well
as a likely local economic boom. Yet the intra-
and inter-regional dynamics make such a
structure potentially difficult to initiate, through
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-statistic Probability
Distance from Assembly Plant
LR Index = .02397
.003202' .001307
-2.45 .0143
Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 2: Results ofan Ordered Logit Regression of "Criticalness" and Distance of Supplierfrom the
Georgetown, KYAssembly Plant
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a) Pioneering Incentives supplier network be established alongside the 3
The potential returns to a region's pioneer assembly plant. The first-mover thus o
economy ofbecoming the seedbed of both the must invest in the crucial supply cornerstones.
%
core plant and the expanding web of supplier Initial sunk costs are tremendous. Furthermore, 1
firms are considerable. Particularly given the such infant networks have very few of the
high value-added character of this market anticipated scale and scope economies, which
segment the inflow ofexport earnings and only develop in tandem with the overall growth
multiplied manufacturing employment could of the regional assembler/supplier network.
significandy influence even the most Note that if such a self-reinforcing pattern of
marginalized area's economic fortunes. growth indeed takes place, the eventual estab-
Spillovers from such enterprises to the local lished web of suppliers will reduce the costs for
(service and retail) sector are likely to be all core followers.
exceptionally large, given both the high-wage This strategic interaction can be mod-
employment structure that develops and the eled in a game-theoretic framework. Pioneers
must weigh the risky entry into a potentially
innovative location, which will shoulder them
with significant supplier network costs but could
also yield sizable profits. Yet other firms might
also eventually consider probing the promise of
the new district, shouldering the supplier burden
while cosdessly illuminating the true viability of
the area for that initial entrepreneur. Each player
thus needs to consider the strategic implications
of their actions. The market failure develops in
the divergence between private and social
benefit-cost considerations.
A two-person, non-cooperative game
theory model can be helpful in understanding
this critical first-mover decision; a similar
structure was used to understand obstacles to
urban redevelopment (Weiler, 2000). Based on
the Weiler, Thompson, and Ozawa (200 1
)
application to potential investment in greenfield
sites, it is clear that private actors will not fully
incorporate the overall social impact of their
actions. Marginal private investments could
nevertheless yield projects with considerable
net social benefits. The private market may
thus underprovide investment to a promising
greenfield area. A potential pioneer may wait
(eternally, in this game) for another private
investor to test the potential site first. Property
rights approaches to this problem, such as
buying adjacent land in anticipation of possible
future capital gains, is fraught with considerable
risk alongside an even greater initial capital
outlay.
b) Public Incentives
While Toyota's success indicates that
greenfield sites can indeed be profitable even
with the sizable peripheral supplier investment,
situations that have less obvious a priori viability
may be neglected. Public support may thus be
justified in motivating pioneers to invest, mitigat-
ing the noted market failure and enhancing
broader social welfare. However, clearing that
pioneering hurdle by the justifiable support of
the public sector is likely to amplify the second
market failure. The spoils of"winning" the
greenfield siting of a new auto production
center, with both core manufacturers and their
supplier network, could substantially boister a
regional economy's fortunes (Fujita& Hill,
1 995). The regional multiplier, where a further
regional boost is provided by new export
dollars re-spent locally, is likely to be enhanced
by precisely the nature of the desired intra-
regional production cycle.
These rewards can be expected to
spawn, and have in fact produced, effective
bidding wars between previously cooperative
regional neighbors, given the spoils that accrue
to the victor. Interestingly, these infamous
incentive packages rank low in a firm's ap-
praisal ofan area's desirability for greenfield
investment (Hansen, 1993; Kieschnick, 1981).
Firms know that they can, and do, generally
force matching packages between competing
regions (Jenn & Nourzad, 1995). In such a
Bertrand-type "price" war, the final effect of the
bidding process would logically shift all the
potential economic rents to the firm, since those
rents are the effective bonus that a region would
inherit with a successful bid. The originally
efficiency-justifiable inclusion ofthe public
sector is likely to only worsen this situation,
since public officials would include the net social
spillovers to the community, and thus be willing
to proffer public funds to attract the desired
firm
Forthcoming work by Ellis and Rogers
(2001 ) shows that in a game-theoretic context
such a situation turns local economic develop-
ment into an inter-regional prisoner's dilemma.
The application to the present greenfield
scenario is particularly noteworthy. All regions
would be better off cooperating by not entering
into an inter-regional competition for the new
plant and its satellites. However, since the
individual region's incentive at that point is to
profferjust a little extra incentive to win the
contest, the cooperative solution quickly
unravels into its suboptimal non-cooperative
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counterpart. As hypothesized above, such
bidding is likely to degenerate into a Bertrand-
type price war. The result of such a Bertrand
game is that all of the potential regional private
and public gains would be bid away, leaving the
winning region bereft of its spoils even before
the arrival ofthe prize.
In addition, global efficiency losses
could result, since the bidding process might
distort the location decision of the firm away
from the most efficient production point. The
short-run political benefits of acquiring a target
industry rarely match the true longer-term
stream ofbenefits. Political considerations are
thus likely to skew proper assessment of
benefits, which can themselves be difficult to
determine accurately. Furthermore, officials
rarely discount the inevitable additional costs of
a new plant, such as congestion and infrastruc-
ture wear (Blair, 1 99 1 ). Public sector efficiency
itselfcould be lost as well, as the myopic focus
on the prize industry shifts resources away from
other public needs that may have greater merit
based on opportunity costs.
IV. PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
This paper has explored the formation
ofa new industrial district and its potential
impact on market outcomes through the ex-
ample of the automobile assemblers and
suppliers in the southeastern United States. The
modern characteristics of the industry necessi-
tate establishment of an intricate network of
suppliers, whose criticalness to the production
process determines the closeness of their ties
and their sites to the core plant. The statistical
results from the Toyota plant in Kentucky
confirm this trend. Honda's recent announce-
ment of a new assembly factory in Alabama
reinforces this paper's perspectives. This new
core plant will explicitly take advantage of the
now well-established supplier network, while
still making the unusual decision to fabricate its
most crucially-specific component, the engine,
in-house at the very same factory as its assem-
bly line (Bradsher, 1999).
However, the creation of other new
industrial districts may pose potentially consid-
erable challenges to market-based solutions, as
shown by the game-theoretic model. The
combination of substantial pioneer risks and
potentially large social spillovers may interact to
potentially hurt not only the local community but
also the wooed industry through efficiency
distortions. The two market failures in fact
reinforce each other, since the first-mover
problem can justify public intervention on its
own efficiency merits. But the non-cooperative
incentives of regions to attract such core-and-
network structures are further increased by the
consequent inclusion of the public sector and its
social benefit calculus, which may effectively
shift not only private but also (poorly specified)
social spillover benefits to the prospective
plant. Even the latter may be hurt in its own
market by establishing itselfin an inefficient site,
as relative resource prices are skewed by the
blizzard ofincentives.
In sum, such industrial districts pose
distinct challenges to traditional market ap-
proaches, as their outcomes may be socially
sub-optimal. Such situations suggest possible
planning solutions for these intertwined market
failures. While inter-related, the public and
private aspects of the noted market failures
need to be addressed separately given their
differing sources. The public incentives prob-
lem, whereby each region has an incentive to
(over)compete for the focal investment, could
be addressed by more cooperative arrange-
ments above the state level. Sites could be
coordinated to maximize global efficiency by
promoting the site offering the greatest net
social benefits. By distributing the net gains to
regions under consideration, the cooperative
solution could net the broadest gains for all
areas.
Yet, even given the removal of this public
incentives problem, private pioneers are likely
to underinvest in promising areas given both the
11
core-plus-network investment costs and
advantages of following such pioneering efforts.
This private incentives problem could be
mitigated by tapered incentive structures to
offset the initially high but declining divergences
between private and social benefits of invest-
ment. Pioneer assemblers are supporting broad
supplier networks with minimal scale econo-
mies. In addition to the fixed costs of supplier
plant investment, the consequent high average
costs ofcomponents leads to substantially
lower private net benefits than the social
benefits of the new economic activity in the
region. Subsidies to close this gap are thus most
justified in these pioneering cases. However, as
more assemblers arrive, scale economies of the
supplier network take hold, with consequent
reductions in the private vs. social benefit/cost
gap, because costs are significandy reduced for
each ensuing follower. (Q>
Endnote
1 An initial list of 1 2 1 suppliers was identified.
However, 3 were removed from the group
because they did not appear to be auto parts.
The three included the suppliers of gasoline,
paper products, and adhesive inserts.
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